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GENEROSITY IN BANKRUPTCY: THE NEW
PLACE OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS IN
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE LAW
Steven Walt*
Should generosity be allowed in bankruptcy when being generous comes at the expense of one's creditors? Congress apparently
thinks so. As part of ongoing efforts to revise bankruptcy law, Congress recently amended the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") with the
Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act' (the
"Act"). The amendments are an attempt to ensure that bankruptcy
does not interfere with a good deal of charitable giving. Prebankruptcy contributions to qualifying charities under prescribed
conditions are insulated from attack as constructively fraudulent
transfers.2 Nor can the trustee avoid the transfer by recourse to state
fraudulent conveyance law.3 The amendments also restrict the occasions on which a court can take into account the making of such
gifts. For instance, a bankruptcy court cannot consider these gifts in
deciding whether to dismiss a bankruptcy case filed under Chapter 7
for substantial abuse of the Chapter. Charitable gifts are excluded
from the individual debtor's disposable income. 5 A debt adjustment
plan proposed in a Chapter 13 case therefore can be confirmed over
the objection of unsecured creditors even when the plan does not
promise to pay them amounts that would otherwise be contributed to
charities. 6 Therefore, in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases, more
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful
to Adam Hirsch, Kevin Kordana, Emily Sherwin and Mary Jo Wiggins for discussions on the topic.
1. Pub. L. No. 105-183 (1998).
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1998); infratext accompanying notes 9-10.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(2) (1998).
4. See id. § 707(b).
5. See id. § 1325(b)(2)(A).
6. See id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
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for qualifying charities means less for creditors of the contributing
debtor. Consequently, the Act has a significant potential impact on
creditors.
Central to the Act is its alteration of fraudulent conveyance law.
The change was of principal importance to the Act's sponsors. Most
of the Act's amendments to the Bankruptcy Code are designed to insulate pre-petition charitable contributions from the reach of fraudulent conveyance law.7 Although I believe that exempting charitable
contributions from a large part of fraudulent conveyance law is a bad
idea, this Article does not evaluate the wisdom of doing so. Rather,
it very briefly describes some statutory difficulties created by the
Act's amendment of the Code. Some statutory changes introduced
by the Act, I shall argue, fail to protect effectively the transfers intended to be protected. Other changes create uncertainty in the application of amended provisions. Although both sorts of change
might be considered merely technical difficulties, comparatively
unimportant in a balanced evaluation of the Act, any informed
8
evaluation, pro or con, must take them into account.
I. SECTION 548's AMENDMENT
The statutory changes made to § 548 are straightforward. The
Act amends § 548 to insulate specified types of transfers from attack
as constructively fraudulent conveyances. 9 Under the unamended
version of § 548(a)(2), a transfer by the debtor constitutes constructive fraud when the debtor does not receive reasonably equivalent
value in return, and when one of three further conditions is satisfied.' 0 At the time of the transfer, the debtor must be either (1) insolvent, (2) left insufficiently capitalized, or (3) must have intended
to incur debts she was unable to pay." The Act alters § 548(a)(2) so
7. See id. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(2); HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
REPORT ON THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHARITABLE
PROTECTION ACT OF 1997, H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 1-2 (1997).

DONATION

8. I provide a fuller evaluation in Generosity In Bankruptcy: The Political
Sources and Incentive Effects of the Charitable Donation Act (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).

9. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1998).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994).
11. See id.
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that a debtor making a specified sort of transfer is deemed to have
received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for it.12 As altered,
§ 548(a)(2) reads:
(2) A transfer of a charitable contribution to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization shall not be considered to be a transfer covered under paragraph (1)(B) in
any case in which(A) the amount of that contribution does not exceed 15
percent of the gross annual income of the debtor for the
year in which the transfer of that contribution is made;
or
(B) the contribution made by a debtor exceeded the
percentage amount of gross annual income specified in
subparagraph (A), if the transfer was consistent with
of the debtor in making charitable contrithe practices
13
butions.
Section 548(d)(3) defines a "charitable contribution" to be a
transfer of cash or a financial instrument by a natural person to a
"qualified religious or charitable entity or organization," as both
14
terms are defined by section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Although the statutory language is convoluted, the consequence
of § 548(a)(2) and (d)(3) is clear: Protected transfers to qualifying
charities cannot be avoided as constructively fraudulent conveyances.' 5 Section 548(a)(1)(B) defines a constructively fraudulent
transfer.16 It includes (a)(1)(B)(i), which requires that the debtor receive less than reasonably equivalent value for the transfer. 17 According to § 548(a)(2), a debtor making a charitable contribution to a
tax-exempt charity, who satisfies either § 548(a)(2)(A) or (B), "shall
not be considered" as having received less than reasonably equivalent value under § 548(a)(1)(B). 18 This means that the debtor is
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1998).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. § 548(d)(3)-(4).
See id. §§ 548(a)(2); 548(d)(3).
See id. § 548(a)(1)(B).
See id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
Id. § 548(a)(2).
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considered to have received at least reasonably equivalent value for
the transfer. Since reasonably equivalent value was received, the
transfer cannot be constructively fraudulent.
The amendment to § 544(b) assures the same result under state
fraudulent conveyance law. 19 Section 544(b)(1) subrogates the trustee to the position of an unsecured creditor under state law to avoid a
transfer of property by the debtor.20 This, of course, includes the
right to avoid constructively fraudulent transfers under state fraudulent conveyance law. Section 544(b)(2) provides that § 544(b)(1) is
inapplicable to transfers "not covered under section 548(a)(1)(B)." 2'
A debtor making a charitable contribution to qualifying charities or
religious entities which satisfies either § 548(a)(2)(A) or (B) is
deemed not to have received less than reasonably equivalent value
under § 548(a)(1)(B).22 Thus, the transfer is "not covered" by the
subsection, and § 544(b)(1) does not apply. The trustee therefore
cannot use state fraudulent conveyance law to avoid such a transfer
as constructively fraudulent. Section 544(b)(2) adds that, under
these circumstances, unsecured creditors also are barred from doing
so on their own behalf.23
II. STATUTORY DEFECTS

The changes to §§ 548 and 544(b) are not models of statutory
draftsmanship. They exhibit both important and somewhat less important but still troublesome defects in drafting. Some of the defects
reflect a failure to insulate successfully the sort of transfers Congress
presumably wanted to protect from fraudulent conveyance attack.
Others are instances of simple lack of clarity. All of the defects no
doubt will occasion some litigation. Five problems in the changes to
§§ 548 and 544(b) are described below.
(1) The Act's purpose is to prevent pre-petition transfers of assets by debtors to religious or charitable organizations from being
treated in bankruptcy as fraudulent conveyances. The amendments
19.
20.
21.
22.

See id. § 544(b)(2).
See id. § 544(b)(1).
Id. § 544(b)(2).
See id. § 548(a)(1)(B).
23. See id. § 544(b)(2).
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to § 548 do not achieve that purpose. They insulate a qualifying
transfer from attack as constructively fraudulent. On the same facts,
however, the transfer still can be avoided as an instance of actual
fraud-a transfer made by the debtor with the intent to delay, hinder,
or defraud creditors. This is because § 548(a)(2) only exempts qualifying transfers from the scope of § 548(a)(1)(B), which defines constructive fraud. It does not exempt the same transfer from the reach
of § 548(a)(1)(A), which defines actual fraud. Thus, with respect to
§ 548(a)(1)(A), the same facts can be used to find that a transfer involves actual fraud by the debtor.
For example, suppose Ms. Jones donates ten percent of her gross
annual income to Church, a qualifying religious entity, a month before she files a bankruptcy petition and while insolvent. She receives
nothing in return and is under no obligation to make the donation.
Since her contribution falls within the terms of § 548(a)(2)(A), Jones
is deemed not to have received less than reasonably equivalent value
from Church under § 548(a)(1)(B). Jones's transfer therefore is not
constructively fraudulent. However, Jones made a donation of ten
percent of her annual gross income while insolvent. She received
nothing in return from Church. Taken together, the facts justify an
inference that Jones intended to hinder, delay, or defraud her creditors.24 Nothing in § 548(a)(2) or § 548(a)(1)(A) prevents the inference. If so, the transfer to Church is avoidable as an instance of actual fraud. Jones could even lose her discharge under § 727(a)(2).
Since the same inference is always possible with transfers described
by § 548(a)(2), the Act's attempt to insulate qualifying charitable
contributions from fraudulent conveyance attack is seriously compromised.
As a drafting technique, the limited change in § 548(a)(2) is an
understandable response to prominent case law. Some noteworthy
cases applying fraudulent conveyance law to contributions to religious organizations deemed the contributions to be constructively
fraudulent. They did so by finding either that no exchange had occurred or that the debtor received no value or less than reasonably
24. Section 548(a)(1)(A) does not require insolvency as a predicate for actual fraud. Insolvency, however, can be used as evidence of fraudulent intent
described by the subsection.
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equivalent value in the exchange.25 An economical way of precluding the finding is to amend § 548 to insulate the offending transfers
from attack only as constructively fraudulent, leaving actual fraud

unaddressed. The legislative history of the Act expresses a hope that
transfers insulated from attack as constructively fraudulent also will

not be found to involve actual fraud.26 Courts are unlikely to vindicate this hope. They are more likely to pay attention to the language
of § 548 and facts surrounding a contribution. Although wavering on
occasion, the Supreme Court has shown a settled and marked prefer27
ence for the literal language of Bankruptcy Code provisions.

Amended § 548(a)(2) only works to exempt qualifying charitable
contributions from avoidance as constructively fraudulent. Its terms
are limited to that sort of fraud "under paragraph (1)(B). ' 8 As interpreted, amended § 548(a) is unlikely to prevent a judicial finding that
qualifying charitable contributions are instances of actual fraud. The

question facing a court will continue to be whether a transfer to a
charity while the debtor is insolvent constitutes fraud.

25. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 89
F.3d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1996); Fitzgerald v. Magic Valley Evangelical Free
Church, Inc. (In re Hodge), 200 B.R. 884, 907 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996).
26. See 144 CONG. REC. H3999, H4000 (daily ed. June 3, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Gekas); cf 144 CoNG. REc. S4769 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (stating that these types of transfers still will be deter-

to involve actual fraud); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON
THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHARITABLE DONATION PROTECTION ACT OF
mined

1997, H.R. REP. No. 105-556, at 5 (1997) (claiming that the right of certain
debtors to make charitable contributions after filing for bankruptcy relief will
be protected).
27. See Carlos J. Cuevas, The Rehnquist Court, Strict Statutory Construction and the Bankruptcy Code, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435 (1994) (discussing
the Court's literal interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code's provisions); Robert
K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme
Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993) (studying the use of

textualism in the Court's analysis of bankruptcy cases); ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23-25, 29-37 (1997) (discussing the virtues of
textualism and rejecting over-emphasis on legislative history); see, e.g., Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S.Ct. 1879, 1884 (1997); Patterson v.
Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 757 (1992); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 15456 (1991); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1998).
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(2) Amended § 548 is limited in effect in another way: Arguably it does not prevent avoidance of charitable contributions
occurring more than a year before the filing of a bankruptcy petition
as constructively fraudulent under state fraudulent conveyance law.
Federal fraudulent conveyance law under § 548(a) allows avoidance
of fraudulent transfers occurring within a year of the filing. According to the amendment to § 544(b)(2), the trustee is prevented
from using state fraudulent conveyance law to reach "a transfer of a
charitable contribution . . . that is not covered under section
548(a)(1)(B), by reason of section 548(a)(2).,, 29 By its own terms, §
548(a)(1)(B) only describes transfers made within a year of the filing
of a bankruptcy petition: "(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer
...that was made.., on or within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, if the debtor... (B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation
....00 Thus, § 544(b)(2) does not prevent the trustee from using
state fraudulent conveyance law to reach transfers made more than a
year before that date. As far as the section goes, the trustee can use
state law to avoid these pre-petition charitable contributions as constructively fraudulent transfers. The possibility is significant because
state fraudulent conveyance laws typically have longer reach-back
periods than federal law.3 1 The arguably limited protection given to
transferees by § 544(b)(2) presumably is the result of the modest
drafting aim of the Act. It does not achieve the Act's purpose of
protecting the range of charitable transfers from attack as constructively fraudulent.
A stock response is that the interpretation of § 544(b)(2) just
discussed, while literally correct, leads to an absurd result, inconsistent with Congress's intent. If Congress wanted to protect qualifying
charitable contributions made within a year of a bankruptcy filing, it
clearly would want to protect pre-petition transfers made before that
time as well. Therefore, it is arguable that not protecting these transfers also may produce an absurd result. The result is not absurd,
29. Id. § 544(b)(2).
30. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
31. See, e.g., California Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3439.09 (West 1996) (four year reach-back period).
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however, when examined more carefully. Limiting § 544(b)(2) to
transfers reachable under federal fraudulent conveyance law may be
inconvenient or unwise. It may leave less recent charitable
contributions more exposed under state law than more recent ones
are. But this is not an absurd consequence. Congress's presumed
purpose is not apparent. However, it could have been moved by federalism concerns-a reluctance to entirely displace state law on constructive fraud. Or, § 544(a)(2) could reflect a division of labor between federal and state law as to avoidance. The case law involves
attacks on charitable contributions made within a year of the filing,
so there might be little cost in not preempting state law as to transfers
made outside this period. More likely, the sparse relevant legislative
history suggests that Congress did not think about the matter at all.
What Congress would have intended if it had concentrated on the
matter, even if relevant, simply is indeterminate. The language of §
544(b)(2) clearly does not preclude the application of state law to
transfers made more than a year prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. Therefore, at the very least, the above interpretation is respectable.32 My point is that the drafting of amended § 544(b)(2)
allows the argument.
(3) The amendment to § 544(b) also combines with § 548(a)(2)
to insulate some patently fraudulent transfers from avoidance under
state law. Section 548(a)(2)(A) protects a contribution to qualifying
entities when it is less than fifteen percent of the debtor's annual
gross income. 33 No restriction is placed on the circumstances under
which the contribution is made, such as its consistency with the
debtor's practice of giving. A contribution therefore can fall under §
548(a)(2)(A) even if the debtor never contributed to a qualifying entity before. Section 548(a)(2) prevents the transfer from being constructively fraudulent under § 548(a)(1)(B). An unprecedented gift
to a qualifying entity still can constitute actual fraud.

32. Cf. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (citing Blum v. Steuson,
465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984)) (stating that clear statutory language controls when
unambiguous and in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent contrary to plain meaning of the statutory language).
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1998).
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The trouble is that amended § 544(b) can prevent the trustee
from avoiding the transfer as actual fraud using state fraudulent conveyance law. Under § 544(b)(2), the trustee is not subrogated to the
rights of an unsecured creditor under state fraudulent conveyance
law if the "transfer of a charitable contribution (as that term is
defined in section 548(d)(3)) . . . is not covered under section
548(a)(1)(B), by reason of section 548(a)(2). '34 If a qualifying transfer fits under § 548(a)(2)'s terms, it is not a constructively fraudulent
transfer "covered" under § 548(a)(1)(B). According to § 544(b)(2),
the trustee therefore cannot avoid the transfer under state law. This
includes avoidance as actual fraud under state fraudulent conveyance
law as well. To be sure, the result almost always will not matter.
The trustee still can use federal fraudulent conveyance law under §
548(a)(1)(A) to find actual fraud. However, some state law contains
standards of proof and evidentiary bases, such as badges of fraud,
making a showing of actual fraud easier.35 As applied, these devices
might make actual fraud easier to establish. By depriving the trustee
of the use of state law, the statute allows some clear cases of actual
fraud to remain unregulated. This is the result of defects in drafting.
(4) Another drafting defect is that amended § 548(a)(2) permits
dividing transfers to avoid a finding of constructive fraud. The
statutory description of the transfers protected by § 548(a)(2) allows
the possibility. This is because neither § 548(a)(2)(A) nor (B) requires aggregation of charitable contributions to tax-exempt entities.36 Section 548(a)(2) refers to "[a] transfer of a charitable
contribution," 37 § 548(a)(2)(A) refers to "the amount of that contribution," 38 and (a)(2)(B) refers to "the contribution., 39 Each of the
references is in the singular and therefore connotes a single transfer.
34. Id. § 544(b)(2).

35. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUD. TRANS. ACT § 4(b), 7A U.L.A. § 4(b) (1985);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.04(b) (West 1997).

36. Tax treatment of charitable contribution requires aggregation. Cf. 26
U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(B) (1997) (stating that a charitable contribution deduction
for an individual taxpayer is allowed to the extent that the aggregate of such
contributions does not exceed fifty percent of the taxpayer's contribution base
for the taxable year).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1998).
38. Id. § 548(a)(2)(A).

39. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B).
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Thus, each of a set of transfers which individually satisfy §
548(a)(2)(A) fall within § 548(a)(2)'s protection even though in the
aggregate they do not. In testing for constructive fraud, § 548(a)(2),
however, does not aggregate individual contributions. This allows for
planning to evade avoidance of transfers as constructively fraudulent.
For instance, assume that Ms. Jones has never before contributed to
qualifying entities. Should she want to safely give all of her annual
gross income to a church within the reach-back period, she need only
divide her contributions into individual gifts of less than fifteen percent of her gross income. Her aggregate contribution would not be
considered constructively fraudulent under § 548(a).
Two possible responses can reduce, but not eliminate, the problem. First, dividing contributions would allow a finding of actual
fraud under § 548(a)(1)(A). However, evidence of actual fraud can
be difficult to discover. This is because a series of discrete contributions can occur innocently, with no plan to evade creditors. Second,
courts could prevent the dividing of contributions by collapsing the
discrete contributions in order to find a single contribution. This
technique has been used in the regulation of leveraged buyouts by
fraudulent conveyance law. Utilizing the technique would be problematic, however, because the statutory reference to "a charitable
contribution" contemplates a discrete transaction. The language of §
548(a)(2) therefore is a barrier to a statutorily justified collapsing of
contributions.
There are also significant differences between the status of the
transferees in leveraged buyouts and qualifying entities defined under § 548(d)(3). The difference is principally in the two groups' sophistication and in their degree of involvement in the transaction.
The difference may ground a policy in favor of collapsing transactions in leveraged buyouts while keeping charitable contributions
discrete. If so, § 548(a)(1)(A) allows for the division of contributions.
(5) A final defect of § 548(a)(2) is that it does not provide for
cases in which a transfer exceeds the amount protected by either §
548(a)(2)(A) or (B). The section therefore does not direct how contributions in excess of the statutorily protected amounts should be
handled. For instance, suppose Ms. Jones contributed twenty percent
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of her gross annual income to church, and has never given to a qualifying charity before. Or,suppose she contributed twenty percent of
her gross annual income, when in the past she always gave only fifteen percent. In the first case, her contribution is not a contribution
described in part (a)(2)(A) because it exceeds the fifteen percent
limit. In the second case, her contribution is not described in part
(a)(2)(B), because it is inconsistent with Ms. Jones's practices.
Could the entire twenty percent contribution be left unprotected in
both cases? Or is each contribution protected under (a)(2)(A) and
(B), respectively, to the extent that it falls within either subsection's
terms? The amendment is simply silent on the matter. The presence
of "to the extent" language elsewhere within § 548 and the Bankruptcy Code supports an inference that its omission in § 548(a)(2) is
intended. 40 This suggests that excess contributions are unprotected
in their entirety. On the other hand, the omission of "to the extent"
language might be accidental, as are other familiar misidentifications
of subsections sometimes present in the Code. Some legislative history supports the inference of inadvertent oversight.41 However, a
court committed to drawing inferences from § 548's language and
structure, not from legislative history, would justifiably not be persuaded.
The importance of the above statutory defects depends in part on
the frequency with which charitable contributions can be attacked as
fraudulent conveyances. Attack by the trustee in a number of cases
is potentially significant, although the point needs to be put carefully.
To date, trustees very seldom have attacked charitable contributions
as fraudulent transfers-on the order of less than one percent of
bankruptcy cases. 42 Clearly, inferences regarding the frequency of
40. See, e.g., §§ 547(c), 548(c), 553(a) (each including the "to the extent"
language); cf 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (excluding the "to the extent" language).
41. See 144 CoNG. REc. H3999-4001 (daily ed. June 3, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Gekas); cf Bankruptcy Issues in Review: The Bankruptcy Code s Effect

on Religious Freedom and a Review of the Need for Additional Bankruptcy
Judgeships: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and
the Courts, 105th Cong. 42 (1997) (statement of Donald S. Bernstein).
42. See CongressionalBudget Office Cost Estimate: S.1244 Religious Liberty and CharitableDonation ProtectionAct of 1998 (visited Mar. 1, 1999)
<http://www.cbo.gov/showdo.cfin?index366&sequence=0&from=5>.
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attack, drawn from sparse and newsworthy case law, overstate the
salience of the phenomenon. A complete assessment, however, must
make two other estimates. The first is the frequency with which
transfers are attacked as fraudulent conveyances by creditors, indirectly, rather than by the trustee. Creditors quite often attack a
debtor's right to a discharge in a Chapter 7 case, alleging that the
43
debtor engaged in actual fraud in making a pre-petition transfer.
Since the same facts bear on the allegation as bear on recovery of a
pre-petition transfer as a fraudulent conveyance, a creditor's motion
to deny a discharge under § 727(a)(2) indirectly attacks a transfer as
fraudulent. Accordingly, denial of discharge under § 727(a)(2) is a
good proxy for a finding of a fraudulent conveyance in a bankruptcy
case. Thus, the number of fraudulent conveyance attacks is not accurately gauged by the number of cases in which a discharge is denied
under § 727(a)(2). Frequency must be considered as well. When
this additional estimate is considered, the number of transfers that
may be attacked increases.
An estimate of the likely rate of attack after passage of the Act
also needs to be made, taking into account the Act's effect on
debtor's behavior. The previously measured rate of trustee attack
occurred against a background of sparse and conflicting case law focusing on the reach of fraudulent conveyance law. Even more important, the frequency of attack occurred prior to passage of the Act.
A debtor's pattern of contributions, however, cannot be considered
an exogenous (fixed) variable. It is plausible that debtors could respond to the Act by altering their charitable giving because the Act
has reduced the "price" of doing so. If debtors respond by increasing
their charitable giving, or by altering circumstances under which they
give, trustees now could find attack worthwhile. The question to ask,
then, is necessarily counterfactual: How many transfers would be
attacked given the passage of the Act and the likely change in debtor
patterns of giving?
There is reason to believe that avoidance actions could become
more frequent after passage of the Act. The frequency with which
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (1998); Hiberia Nat'l Bank v. Perez (In re

Perez), 954 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1992); Pavy v. Chastant (In re Chastant), 873
F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1989).
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charitable donations are attacked as fraudulent depends on whether
trustees find it worthwhile to pursue them. At least three variables
are involved in the trustee's decision: the trustee's compensation for
attacking a transfer, the frequency with which attackable charitable
donations are made, and the doctrinal or statutory bases allowing for
successful attack. Although the variables probably interact and their
estimation is speculative, some guesses can be made. A trustee's
willingness to pursue transfers depends on her schedule of compensation. At present, the trustee's compensation is based on the value
of the trustee's "services." 44 "Services" contemplates an ex ante assessment of the expected value of the trustee's activity. 45 An increase in the expected value of attacking a transfer increases the
trustee's incentive to bring an avoidance action. The Act reduces the
"price" of debtors' charitable giving, and, other things being equal,
increases the rate and amounts of charitable donations. Although the
Act reduces the likelihood of successful attack by protecting an expanded set of donations, its statutory defects leave exposed a range
of charitable contributions that might well be subject to avoidance.
The net effect of an increase in charitable giving by debtors and
some continued exposure to avoidance could increase the number of
donations potentially subject to attack. The estate could be expected
to benefit from the trustee's attempt to recover a range of donations.
In these circumstances, trustees' incentives to attack donations therefore might be enhanced. Consequently, the increased rates and
amounts of charitable giving could increase significantly the number
of avoidance actions brought. This consequence demonstrates the
extreme significance of the Act's statutory defects.
III. CONCLUSION

The success of a statutory amendment can be judged in two
ways: by whether it achieves its purpose and by whether it creates

44. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 326(a), 330(a) (1998).

45. See id. § 330(a)(1)(A) ("reasonable compensation for actual, necessary
services rendered.. ."). A proposal in the ongoing bankruptcy reforms would

compensate the trustee by "commission" calculated by "result"--success in
avoiding a transfer. The proposal's measure of compensation therefore is ex
post value, the equivalent of a contingent fee.
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uncertainty in applicable law. Applying these standards to § 548, the
amendment receives mixed marks. As amended, § 548, contrary to
its purpose, under-protects the transfers intended to be protected.
This is because § 548(a)(2) prevents avoidance of a qualifying
charitable contribution as constructively fraudulent. However, under
the same facts, actual fraud still can be determined. Before the Act,
transfers could be avoided as actually or constructively fraudulentor both. After the Act, a qualifying charitable contribution still can
be found to involve actual fraud under § 548(a)(1). The debtors may
be in the practice of charitable giving, but the circumstances may
have changed. For example, perhaps the debtor gave while insolvent. The question thus arises: Did the debtor intend to hinder, delay or defraud creditors in these changed circumstances? Courts
continue to face this question, as they did prior to the amendment of
§ 548(a)(2). Although the litigation strategies will change, one does
not have to be a legal realist to believe that the amendment will not
change the outcomes of many cases. If the Act's purpose is to insulate qualifying charitable contributions from attack, the amendment
is only partially successful. The mere change will only affect the
way in which such transfers are regulated.
At the same time, amended §§ 548 and 544 also create significant legal uncertainty. They allow respectable arguments for different results, with no statutorily prescribed means of resolution. Arguably, § 544(b) continues to allow, under state fraudulent
conveyance law, avoidance of charitable contributions made more
than a year before the filing of a bankruptcy petition. These transfers
remain avoidable as constructively fraudulent under state law. Arguably, under § 548(a)(2)(A), debtors also can "distribute" charitable
contributions under § 548(a)(2)(A) to remain within the fifteen percent ceiling set by the subsection. In addition, amended § 548 does
not address the treatment of amounts contributed in excess of those
protected by § 548(a)(2). Again, my point is not that the amendment
underwrites these arguments. It is only that they are reasonable arguments allowed by the language of the amendment. The Code does
not help the debate between contested interpretations of the amended
provisions.
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Bankruptcy courts are notoriously diverse in their understanding
of important Bankruptcy Code provisions. This makes the prospect
of different interpretations of §§ 548 and 544's amendments very
real. The Supreme Court's approach is more settled. It shows an inclination to give effect to the plain meaning of clear statutory language and statutory structure, and a distaste for reliance on legislative history and bankruptcy policy. Here, however, this preference
might not introduce significant legal certainty into fraudulerit conveyance law. There can be disagreement over the "clarity" of a
statutory provision,46 the structural relation among provisions, and
the inferences drawn from them. The Act can be criticized for making this disagreement possible.

46. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (discussing
whether "reasonably equivalent value" in pre-amendment 11 U.S.C. §
548(a)(2)(A) is ambiguous); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (showing
that majority and dissent disagree as to whether 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) is ambiguous); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (majority and dissent disagree as to whether statutory language is clear).
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